After the initial requirement of compensation discussion and analysis (CD&A) in proxy documents, SEC reviewed 350 companies' CD&A in 2007 and reported lack of readability and clarity in this document. Hence we examined the readability measures of CD&A from 2007 to 2013. We also compared the CD&A to the 'letter to the shareholders' and the management discussion and analysis (MD&A) of annual report in 2012 for the differences in readability. As expected, the CD&A was less readable than the letter to shareholders, but more readable than MD&A. We also found that although year-to-year change in readability was small, readability of CD&A had improved significantly over the years. In addition, we found that the higher the excess CEO compensation, the more readable the CD&A, providing evidence for the litigation and legitimacy theories.
Introduction
In 1997, the securities exchange commission (SEC) Chairman, Arthur Levitt issued a challenge to all SEC employees to "find [the] worst piece of 'gobbledygook' and transform it into Plain English". One savings bond prospectus entry won the first place. This anecdotal evidence demonstrated the poor readability in certain SEC filings. In 1998, the SEC officially released a handbook on "How to Create Clear SEC Disclosure Documents". The objective of this handbook was to assist companies that report to the SEC and investors to provide their information in Plain English -making them easier to understand and allowing investors to make informed decisions about their investments. Plain English has also been mandated for federal government documents since the 1990s with varied success on implementation (http://www.plainlanguage.gov/whatisPL/ govmandates/index.cfm). Although Plain English is only mandated for prospectus filings, SEC leaders clearly encourage firms to follow Plain English principles in all their filings and communications with shareholders, including annual reports and proxy statements.
'Plain Language' or 'Plain English' have been used interchangeably in many articles on the Plain Language movement in the US. Plain English has been defined by various authors as:
• "Language that reflects the interests and needs of the reader and consumer rather than the legal, bureaucratic, or technological interests of the writer or of the organisation that the writer represents" (Steinberg, 1991) .
• "Goal of the plain-language movement is to produce language (particularly written English) which is clear, straightforward expression, using only as many words as are necessary, and which avoids obscurity, inflated vocabulary and convoluted sentence construction" (Berry, 1995) .
• "Plain language (also called Plain English) is communication your audience can understand the first time they read or hear it. Language that is plain to one set of readers may not be plain to others. Written material is in plain language if your audience can: find what they need; understand what they find; and use what they find to meet their needs" (www.plainlanguage.gov/whatisPL/).
Regardless of the definitions of Plain English, the focus for the Plain English movement is to improve the readability of legal or government documents, rules or memos that the common folk would have trouble understanding. The movement is not limited to government agencies; American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, for example, has a 'Center for Plain English Accounting' that helps practitioners interpret and apply technical accounting rules in straight-forward and clear writing. Internationally, both in the UK and New Zealand, there are annual best Plain English awards for accounting reports. Clearly there is wide interest from governments, accounting profession and investment public for reporting in Plain English.
In 2006, the SEC required companies to add a new section called Compensation Discussion & Analysis (CD&A) to their proxy documents. There had been complaints from both institutional and experienced individual investors that details of executive compensation, especially total compensation, were never reported by companies. As a response, SEC required companies to report detailed compensation disclosures in Plain English and with a summary table providing the total and component compensation for the top five earners of each company. In addition to salaries and bonuses, the disclosure must include relevant stock options, pensions, perquisites and payments on termination of the employee. After the first year CD&As were filed, the SEC also launched an internal review of the CD&A on its readability and clarity. One principal recommendation of the investigation is "the manner of presentation matters -in particular, using Plain English and organising tabular and graphical information in a way that helps the reader understand a company's disclosure".
Prior literature has examined readability of financial reports such as annual reports (10-K), the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of annual reports and even analyst reports (Li, 2008; Lehavy et al. 2011; Lawrence, 2013; De Franco et al., 2013) . But so far there is limited academic research on the readability of CD&A, with the exception of Laksmana, Tietz and Yang (2012) . Executive compensation has always been a popular, often controversial, issue. As the official venue of disclosure for executive compensation, CD&A is likely to be closely read by investors, analysts and the general public. Hence we proposed a study to examine the level of readability of CD&A in comparison to the readability of MD&A and letters to shareholders. Given that several years have passed since the SEC revealed its observation and suggestions on CD&A, we also studied the changes in CD&A readability over the years. In addition, we investigated the relationship between excess CEO compensation and the readability of CD&A.
We found that, compared to letters to shareholders, companies' CD&As are less readable; when compared to company MD&As in the annual reports, CD&A is more readable based on Fog and Flesch measures. But CD&A is less readable than the MD&A when based on the Plain English measure. This may be due to the more complicated details of compensation being disclosed using more legalese and passive language. Over the years, however, the readability of CD&As has gradually and steadily improved.
Finally, we find that for companies with more excess CEO compensation, their CD&As are more readable based on Fog and Flesch measures, while the Plain English measure of readability is not affected by excess pay. These results suggest that companies are in compliance with the Plain English rule, regardless of excess CEO pay. But to justify excess compensation in fear of litigation, companies use more readable language in CD&As in terms of Fog and Flesch measures. Further analyses indicate that the positive association between CD&A readability and excess CEO pay is driven by excess noncash overpay of the compensation.
We contribute to the growing stream of research on qualitative analysis of financial disclosures by examining CD&A readability after the SEC review of the CD&A in 2007. We compare the readability among the letters to the shareholders, MD&A and CD&A.
We also study the trend of CD&A readability between 2007 and 2013. In our analysis of excess CEO pay and CD&A readability relationship, we decompose the CEO compensation into overpay vs. underpay and cash vs. noncash compensation in an effort to examine the underlying compensation component(s) that drive our results.
Prior research on readability of 10-K, MD&A and CD&A suggests that the readability is strategically used by management to obfuscate poor earnings or excess CEO compensation (Li, 2008; Robinson, Xue and Yu, 2011; Laksmana, Tietz and Yang, 2012) . Laksmana, Tietz and Yang (2012) , in particular, find that in the year 2006 (proxy year 2007) companies with excess CEO compensation report less readable CD&A. However, litigation and legitimacy theories suggest that managers are inclined to justify high compensation with more readable CD&A (Bloomfield, 2008; Stratling, 2007) . Also, Laksmana, Tietz and Yang (2012) do not find any evidence of obfuscation in 2007 (proxy year 2008), and argue that CD&A readability has increased in that year in response to heightened public scrutiny and regulatory oversight. Our research contributes by providing preliminary evidence in support of similar improved CD&A readability and positive association between excess CEO pay and CD&A readability.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews prior literature and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 provides details on sample selection and methodology. Section 4 presents the main hypotheses testing and additional analysis results, while Section 5 concludes the paper.
Literature review and hypotheses development
To examine the impact of Plain English rule, we use textual analysis to investigate firms' filings. There is a growing research in accounting and finance using the textual analysis of qualitative information (Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky and Macskassy, 2008; Li, 2008; Lehavy, Li and Merkley, 2011; Loughran and McDonald, 2011; Larcker and Zakolyukina, 2012; Huang, Teoh and Zhang, 2014) . These papers have studied various qualitative dimensions of the disclosures such as positive vs. negative tone (Tetlock Saar-Tsechansky and Macskassy, 2008; Huang, Teoh and Zhang, 2014) , readability (Li, 2008; Lehavy, Li and Merkley, 2011) and self-reference bias (Larcker and Zakolyukina, 2012) . Our focus is on the readability of company CD&A in the proxy statement. Previous literature has investigated readability of narrative forms of financial disclosures (Li, 2008; Laksmana, Tietz and Yang, 2012; Lawrence, 2013; Loughran and McDonald, 2014a; Loughran and McDonald, 2014b) . Our focus is on the readability of company CD&A, in the spirit of the study by Laksmana, Tietz and Yang (2012) . They analyse the readability of the CD&A for the proxy years 2007 and 2008. They find that in proxy year 2007, companies with overpaid CEOs tended to report less readable CD&As. In proxy year 2008, however, they find that readability of CD&A is not associated with CEO overpayment. They suggest that in 2007, overpaid CEOs obfuscated compensation disclosures, but criticism from the SEC, shareholders and corporate groups in late 2007 motivated them to improve readability in 2008. Our paper extends this research by examining the relation between CD&A readability and excess CEO compensation after the proxy year 2008.
Following prior literature, we employ three indexes to measure readability: Fog index, Flesch score and Plain English measure.
Readability measures
The first measure of readability is the Fog index from computational linguistics literature. It is developed by Robert Gunning, and is a simple formula for measuring readability.
Average number of words per sentence 0 . 4
Percentage of complex words • Word length: the average number of characters in each word. The SEC's documentation mentions the use of 'short, common words.'
• Passive: a count of passive words in the document. Auxiliary verb variants of 'to be' includes: 'to be', 'to have', 'will be', 'has been', 'have been', 'had been', 'will have been', 'being', 'am', 'are', 'is', 'was', and 'were'. Auxiliary verbs followed by a word ending in 'ed' or one of 158 irregular verbs, such as 'caught' and 'struck', are defined as passive words. The handbook emphasises the importance of avoiding passive voice.
• Legalese: a count of the words and phrases identified in Staff Legal Bulletin No. 7 (http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb7a.htm) as inappropriate legal jargon. A list of 12 phrases and 48 words are identified, examples include 'qualified in its entirety' or 'hereinafter so surrendered'.
• Personal pronouns: a count of personal pronouns, whose usage the handbook (p.22) indicates will 'dramatically' improve the clarity of writing. The handbook targets first-person plural and second-person singular personal pronouns. Counts are tabulated for 'we', 'us', 'our', 'ours', 'you', 'your', 'yours'.
• Others: the count of negative phrases, superfluous words and the word 'respectively' combined.
Specifically, negative phrases refer to 11 negative compound phrases identified on page 27 of the handbook (e.g., 'does not have' or 'not certain'). Superfluous words refer to eight phrases identified as superfluous on page 25 of the handbook (e.g., 'because of the fact that' or 'in order to'). Respectively is a count of each occurrence of the word 'respectively'. Among these three measures, Fog and Flesch stem from linguistic research and are traditionally used for measuring textual readability as a function of syllables per word and words per sentence. In contrast, Plain English focuses on measuring compliance to the SEC Plain English initiative. In addition to the word length and sentence length, Plain English also includes measures of passive tense, legalese and personal pronouns specified in the initiative. Therefore, Plain English is more of a gauge of rule compliance, whereas Fog and Flesch focus on reading ease (Loughran and McDonald, 2014b) .
Hypotheses
Among all of the company reports and filings, the company president's letter to shareholders is most likely the easiest to read. Management uses the letter to summarise its performance for the past year, convey its outlook for the future and rally for shareholder support. A letter to shareholders is not a mandatory filing required by the SEC. Hence, there are no reporting rules or technical requirements. Compared to mandatory filings such as annual reports (10-k) and proxy documents, a letter to shareholders is used more as a public relations tool. It is meant to be written in simple Plain English and easily readable to shareholders. Therefore, we first choose to use the readability of letter to shareholders as the baseline, and expect CD&A to be less readable. The MD&A section in the annual reports contains a detailed discussion of the company's past performance and its implications on the future. But MD&A is part of the 10-K filing with the SEC, and it is usually much longer and more technical than the letter to shareholders. In fact, there were complaints that MD&A is over technical; that it is next to unreadable (Tavcar, 1998) . According to Li (2008) , the average Fog indexes of annual reports and MD&A were 19.39 and 18.23, which are 'unreadable' according to the standard interpretation of the index. The CD&A is another technical report required by SEC that discloses a company's detailed compensation structure of employees, especially top level executives. But CD&A is a newer document, in effect only after SEC 2006 compensation disclosure rules that specifically emphasise reporting in Plain English. It has also had the advantage of the 2007 SEC review on its readability. Many companies reviewed had to re-file their CD&As to improve document readability. So we expect that 5 years after the review and 3 years after the findings have been released, company CD&A will be more readable as compared to the MD&A.
H1: In 2012, a company's CD&A will be less readable than the company president's letter to shareholders, but more readable than its MD&A.
The SEC division of corporate finance reviewed 350 companies' CD&As in 2007, and reported the details of their findings in 2009. The 350 public companies were chosen across a wide range of industries. The SEC comments were on the manner of presentation, format of the statement and clarity of the disclosures. The summary of the comments indicated that the SEC felt that the readability of the documents was poor and needed more clarity. They suggested more tables, more details on how and why the compensation decisions were made and the implications of such decision-making.
Robinson, Xue and Yu (2011) provided a direct study on this review. They grouped all noncompliance comments into three categories: pay-for-performance disclosure, corporate governance and readability. They found that none of the 300 plus firms reviewed were 100% compliant with the 2006 disclosure rules. An average SEC critique includes 8 comments on pay-for-performance, 3 on governance and 1 on readability. The SEC Report stressed that the companies reviewed were randomly selected, and not targeted for their non-compliance. Robinson, Xue and Yu (2011) also randomly selected 50 non-reviewed firms and confirmed that their CD&As contained violations similar to those of the firms reviewed. These findings suggest that non-compliance was excessive when the 2006 disclosure rules were initially adopted.
As a result of this internal review, all companies filing proxy documents are expected to improve the quality of their CD&As, including readability. First, if a company reviewed received more than one comment, it was forced to re-file its proxy documents to address the issues raised. Secondly, the final SEC review finding was released in 2009 with recommendations for all firms to improve on rule compliance. Finally, even after the focused internal review, the SEC staffs continue to issue comment letters to critique noncompliance. Given that it took 3 years from the initial adoption and the SEC review to be completed, we selected 3 years after 2009 as the comparison date to examine the changes in CD&A readability. We hypothesise that:
H2: Readability of CD&A will improve from 2007 to 2012.
Economic theories suggest that the information content of corporate disclosure is a function of the firm's performance, litigation risk and information environment. Litigation concerns may encourage firms to be more cautious in their disclosures. This also implies that managers may disclose more readable reports to reduce litigation risk. Nelson & Pritchard (2007) found that firms with high litigation risk tend to provide more details about their risk factors in an easier to read language so that "it is viewed as meaningful by the courts". Executive compensation has always been a controversial topic for shareholders and media. Think-tanks such as Institute for Policy Studies (http://www.ips-dc.org/) and United for a Fair Economy (http://www.faireconomy.org/) publish reports that compare CEO compensation and that of an average US worker, highlighting the vast differences between CEO and worker pay (http://www.ipsdc.org/executive_excess_20_years/). In case of excess executive compensation, the CEO has a strong incentive to justify the total compensation received in a more readable format. Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) suggest that an increase in CEO compensation may be explained by an increase in disclosures mandated by the SEC, as management may demand more pay as a result of additional disclosure work. With the requirement of CD&A disclosures mandated by the SEC, it is likely that there is an increase in compensation that may need to be explained to investors. In addition, legitimacy theory (Stratling, 2007; Laksmana, Tietz and Yang, 2012) postulates that public disclosures are often used to change the perception about the company. With such a controversial issue as executive compensation, and the news media coverage about the widening gap between worker and CEO pay, it is likely that CEOs will be motivated to use CD&A to legitimise executive compensation and firm performance. We predict that:
H3a: Excessive CEO compensation will be positively associated with CD&A readability. Li (2008) finds that firms with lower earnings have less readable annual reports, and that readability increases with earnings persistence in firms that are profitable. He concludes that managers report tone strategically to mask a lower level or lower persistence of earnings, consistent with the incomplete revelation hypothesis and an obfuscation incentive (Bloomfield, 2002 (Bloomfield, , 2008 . Lakshmana et al. (2012) separated their sample into overpaid and underpaid CEOs, and found that in 2007 proxy year, the incomplete revelation hypothesis and management obfuscation hypothesis are supported for overpaid CEOs. Other researchers also provide supplementary supporting evidence such as individual investors being more likely to invest in firms whose annual reports are more readable (Lawrence, 2013) , or analyst following and informativeness of their reports being greater for firms with less readable 10-Ks (Lehavy, Li and Merkley, 2011) . If the readability of annual reports can be used by management to mask earning deficiency, it stands to reason that CD&A readability can also be manipulated to mask excessive compensation. As an extreme, if executives are compensated with fixed salaries only, there would be no need to explain the pay-for-performance policy, bonus targets etc.; hence, the CD&A would be easy to read. On the other hand, if executives are compensated excessively with multiple venues such as bonus, options and perks, there would be more need for jargons and formulas, making CD&A less readable. We predict:
H3b: Excessive CEO compensation will be negatively associated with CD&A readability.
Methodology

Sample
We selected companies on the S&P Top 100 list of July 2013 as our sample, as these are the most well-known public companies with large institutional and individual investor following. Filings of these companies to SEC are the major means of communication to investors, and are read and studied by investors, creditors and other related parties. Hence, we collected sample companies' CD&A from proxy statements of 2007, to establish the baseline readability when the CD&A was initially required, and we collected the same data in 2009, to reflect any immediate change in readability after the SEC review. As it may take time for the review results to take effect, we decided to collect data in 2012, 3 years after the release of review results, to investigate long-term change in readability. In addition, we also collected sample firms' MD&A and 'letters to shareholder' in the annual reports of 2012 so that we can compare the readability among the three types of documents that communicate with shareholders. To further analyse the potential short-term change in readability of CD&A, we also collected data from proxy statements of 2013.
Out of the 100 companies on the list, seven were either merged or delisted, and were excluded from the analysis. Of the remaining 93 companies, ten companies had partial data missing. These ten firms were kept in the analysis, but analysis without these 10 firms generated qualitatively similar findings. Financial data are obtained from COMPUSTAT by matching GVKEY. 
Excess CEO compensation
where Compensation is CEO actual total compensation, and the determinants include CEO's tenure, firm size, growth opportunity and firm performance. The expected pay is the predicted value from the estimated CEO compensation regression, and the excess pay is the residual. We calculated excess compensation by estimating expected compensation of Equation (1) and subtracting it from actual compensation. Specifically,
The variables and method for computing excess compensation is described in more detail in Appendix A.
Model specification
We test our hypothesis 3 on the association between readability of CD&A and CEO excess compensation using the following regression model:
READABILITY indicates the three readability measures mentioned above: Fog, Flesh and Plain English. EXCESS_COMP is obtained from Equation (2). We also include determinants of readability as control variables following prior literature (Li, 2008; Loughran and McDonald, 2014a; Loughran and McDonald, 2014b) . These are measures for the firms' fundamental information, growth opportunities, business risks and complexities. SIZE is logarithm of market value of equity at fiscal year-end. BTM is book-to-market ratio measured at fiscal year-end. EARN is income before extraordinary items divided by total assets at fiscal year-end. RET is contemporaneous annual stock returns calculated using CRSP monthly return data. The number of business segments (BUSSEG) and geographic (GEOSEG) segments are proxies for operating complexity of the firm. BUSSEG is log(1 + number of business segments) or 1 if item is missing from Compustat, GEOSEG is log(1 + number of geographic segments) or 1 if the item is missing from COMPUSTAT.
Results
Firm descriptive statistics
Summary statistics of sample firms are provided in Table 1 . Based on SIC (from COMPUSTAT) codes, the firms are classified into 12 Fama-French industries (Fama and French, 1997) . Our sample firms are from 11 industries and are clustered mostly in the following industries: finance, manufacturing, business equipment and healthcare. The average market value of equity in July 2013 is reported by industries. Energy industry has the highest market value and utilities industry has the lowest one. The average market value of overall firms is $85,039 million. We report the average number of words used, numbers used, Fog index, Flesch score and Plain English measure for each year and each type of disclosure in Table 2A . In 2007, the average number of words used in CD&A is 8,172 with 676 numbers; the average Fog index is 18.86, Flesch score of 29.01 and P measure of −2.38. Over the years, there is a consistent increase in the average number of words and numbers used in CD&A. Despite the fact that CD&A is getting lengthier and uses more letters, it's Fog and Flesch indexes show slight improvement while Plain English measures consistently improve. In Table  2B , we report means of total words, total numbers, and each readability measure by industries. The highest average total words used in CD&A are in finance industry and the highest total numbers used are in consumer durables industry. In terms of readability measures, disclosures of chemicals and allied products industry are the most readable using Fog index; disclosures of shops industry are the most readable using Flesch and Plain English index. Next, we report the correlations among various measures of readability using 2012 CD&A, MD&A, and letter to shareholders in Table 3 . The predicted signs of correlations are presented in Panel A of Table 3 . The number of words used and numbers used are always significantly and positively correlated with each other, but they are not consistently correlated with other readability measures. In particular, the number of words used is not related to Fog, Flesch or Plain English in all three reports; and the number of numbers used is positively correlated with Fog (negatively related with Flesch) of MD&A, and negatively related with Fog (positively related to Flesch) in letter to shareholders. As such, the number of words and numbers used in a report seem to measure the length of a report only. They do not capture the degree of readability in a report. On the other hand, the other three measures of readability are highly connected. For example, Fog index is always negatively correlated with the Flesch score in all three reports, as both measures include average number of words per sentence and measures of word syllables. In addition, Plain English measure is positively correlated with Fog and negatively correlated with Flesch for both MD&A and letter to shareholders. 
Results for hypotheses 1 and 2 testing
In Table 4 , we report the readability comparison among 2012 CD&A, MD&A and the letter to shareholders. Comparing to MD&A, CD&A is shorter and uses fewer numbers, but the results on the other three readability measures are conflicted. CD&A is more readable according to Fog and Flesch, but less readable according to Plain English measure. In other words, CD&A reporting might have included fewer words per sentence and fewer multi-syllable words than MD&A, but it still contained more legalese and passive language. When compared to the 'letter', however, CD&A is longer and less readable across the measures. To sum up, as expected, letter to shareholders is the most readable among the three means of reports. CD&A is shorter than MD&A, but it still needs improvement in terms of Plain English measure. So hypothesis 1 was partially supported. We then report the changes in CD&A readability measures throughout the test periods in Table 5 . With the exception of Plain English measure, changes in all other measures are insignificant in the interim comparisons (2009 vs. 2007, 2010 vs. 2009, 2013 vs. 2012 The effect of such change in readability was specially prominent in Plain English, as not only the overall change but also a couple of interim changes (2009 vs. 2007 and 2012 vs. 2009 ) are significant (t = 2.339, p < 0.002; t = 2.716, p < 0.008.). In reporting CD&A, firms have responded to the Plain English initiative with longer reports, but more readable texts. Hypothesis 2 was supported. 
Results for hypothesis 3 testing
We report in Table 6 the descriptive statistics of CEO compensation variables. The mean and median of CEO compensation were $18.950 million and $12.756 million, respectively. The mean and median of excess compensation from Equation (2) were $0.008 million and $0.060 million, respectively. We also calculated the CEO excess cash and excess noncash compensation, and reported their means, medians and standard deviations in Table 6 . Data analysis results of H3 using excess CEO compensation are presented in Table 7. 1 Hypothesis 3 predicts an association between CD&A readability and excess CEO compensation. We use CD&A readability measures as the dependent variable, excess total CEO compensation as the independent variable while controlling for company size, year-end book-to-market ratio, ROA, annual stock return and operating complexity. The coefficients on main variable EXCESS_COMP are not significant for average word count or number count. The coefficients are significant for two readability measures, Fog and Flesch, but not significant for Plain English. Specifically, the coefficient of EXCESS_COMP on Fog index was −0.155 (p = 0.052); the coefficient of EXCESS_COMP on Flesch index was 0.588 (p = 0.016). These results indicated that 2 According to the results from Fog and Flesch, the higher excess CEO total compensation, the more the readability of its CD&A. Variable definitions: EXCESS_COMP = Compensation − Expected Compensation; SIZE = log(market value of equity at fiscal year-end); BTM = book to market ratio at fiscal year-end; EARN = income before extraordinary items/total assets at fiscal year-end; RET = annual stock returns using CRSP monthly returns; BUSSEG = log(1 + number of business segments); GEOSEG = log(1 + number of geographic segments).
We did not find the significant results for Plain English. The reason may be that Plain English is not about the notion of general readability, but more on the managers' response to the Plain English rule. As Loughran and McDonald (2014b) proposed, Plain English measure is dictated by the specific recommendations promulgated by the SEC, and measures more on the "management's adoption of the specific stylistic recommendations of the Plain English rule in documents". As shown in the above section, companies have been consistently and increasingly following the Plain English rules as indicated by the improvement in Plain English measure between 2007 and 2013. Therefore, we find that managers follow the Plain English rule in writing CD&A regardless of excess compensation.
To further analyse the association between EXCESS_COMP and CD&A readability, we test the regression models of readability measures on EXCESS_COMP and other control variables year by year. However, we do not find any significant result in any specific year. This may be due to the low power of our small sample in an individual year (around 90 observations each year). It also indicates that the significant association between EXCESS_COMP and Fog and Flesch index that we observed is not driven by any specific year. Next, following Laksmana, Tietz and Yang (2012) , we examine the relation between overpaid or underpaid CEO and readability of CD&A. We calculate the variable DIFF, the difference between a CEO's actual total compensation and the expected pay calculated from the Equation (1), deflated by the actual pay. DIFF is the proportion of a CEO's actual pay that is not explained by the economic determinants of compensation. We then create two CEO pay related variables, OVERPAID and UNDERPAID. If DIFF is positive, OVERPAID is equal to DIFF, and zero otherwise. If DIFF is zero or negative, UNDERPAID is equal to DIFF, and zero otherwise. A CEO is overpaid (underpaid) if the CEO's total compensation is in excess (shortage) of the expected pay. The variables OVERPAID and UNDERPAID replaced EXCESS_COMP in the regression model (2), specifically, The results are presented in Table 8 . The coefficients of the main variable OVERPAID were negatively significant for Fog and positively significant for Flesch respectively, but the coefficients of UNDERPAID were not significant. These results show that CEO overpayment is positively associated with readability of CD&A. The more the excess CEO overpay, the easier it is to read the CD&A.
Additional analysis
Generally, executive compensation includes cash and noncash compensation. Cash compensation is comprised of salary and bonus (CASH_COMP). In addition to cash compensation, companies may also distribute noncash compensation such as option awards, stock awards, non-equity incentive plan compensation. NONCASH_COMP is the difference between total compensation and cash compensation. Thus, we decompose CEO excess compensation into two parts: excess cash compensation (EXCESS_CASH) and excess noncash compensation (EXCESS_NONCASH) to further investigate the relationship between CEO compensation component and readability of CD&A. We first use CASH_COMP (NONCASH_COMP) as the dependent variable instead of Compensation in Equation (1) Variable definitions: NONCASH_COMP = total compensation as per ExecuComp -cash compensation; SIZE = log(market value of equity at fiscal year-end); BTM = book to market ratio at fiscal year-end; EARN = income before extraordinary items/total assets at fiscal year-end; RET = annual stock returns using CRSP monthly returns; BUSSEG = log(1 + number of business segments); GEOSEG = log(1 + number of geographic segments).
The results are demonstrated in Table 9 . For excess cash compensation (Table 9A) , the coefficients of OVERPAID on Fog or Flesch index are not significant. For excess noncash compensation (Table 9B) , the coefficient of OVERPAID on Fog index is negative and significant (coefficient = − 1.379, p = 0.056) and the coefficient of OVERPAID on Flesch index is positive and significant (coefficient = 5.168, p = 0.020). These results indicate that for companies that pay out higher excess CEO noncash compensation, their CD&As are more readable. But excess CEO cash compensation is not related to CD&A readability. We believe there are two reasons for such a significant result between only excess noncash pay and readability. First, CEO noncash compensation is a much larger component than cash compensation in the overall pay. The average noncash CEO compensation in our sample is 16.696 million, compared to the average of 2.254 million cash compensation. Furthermore, there is more variation in excess noncash compensation than in excess cash compensation (standard deviation of 1.734 m vs. 1.267 m). As noncash compensation is the more prominent component in the overall pay, it is likely to be more closely scrutinised and followed by shareholders, investors and the general public. Therefore, in case of excess noncash pay, managers need to explain and clarify more due to litigation concerns. Secondly, cash compensation is made up of salary and bonus. Salary is often a fixed amount based on a contract while bonus is determined by formulae, provided the executive meets the conditions for bonus. In the CD&A, explanation of the salary and bonus does not involve complicated definitions and is relatively standard. On the other hand, companies differ in their noncash compensation policies, and noncash compensation includes complicated components such as total value of restricted stock granted, net value of stock options exercised, and long-term incentive payouts. These items need more details to make them clear and understandable for readers. Often they include jargon and phrases that are routine to analysts and institutional investors who are more knowledgeable, but could be difficult for the less knowledgeable individual investor. Therefore the readability of CD&A is more likely to be driven by write up for noncash compensation section of the CD&A. In other words, there is little room for readability improvement for the cash compensation description portion of the CD&A, even if the CEO receives excess cash pay and feels the need to justify. But managers can improve the readability of noncash compensation description significantly if the CEO feels the need to do so.
Conclusions
The CD&A is a new disclosure requirement by the SEC for companies whose fiscal year ended after December 15, 2006. The SEC mandates that the disclosure should be in Plain English with tables and summaries, making the document readable to the general public.
To investigate the level of readability of CD&A, we first compare the CD&A to the Letter to shareholders and MD&A in annual reports in 2012. We use the average number of words used, numbers used, Fog index, Flesch score and Plain English measure for our analysis. We find that the letter to the shareholders is the most readable as hypothesised. Though CD&A is more readable than MD&A based on Fog and Flesch, we find that CD&A is less readable as per the mandated Plain English measure. This could be due to the technical and legal details of compensation, especially description of noncash compensation, and the use of passive language. This analysis also gives us a benchmark on the ranking of the three documents in terms of readability. The SEC reviewed 350 CD&As in 2007 and provided suggestions on making the disclosure more understandable in a report in 2009. As companies are expected to learn from this review and improve the readability of CD&A, we examine the CD&A in 2007, 2009, 2012 and 2013 to investigate the long-term readability changes in CD&A. Despite the fact that CD&A has become lengthier in terms of the number of words and numbers used, there has been gradual but noticeable readability improvement for Fog, Flesch and Plain English measures over the sample period. Though interim changes in CD&A readability are small, there is a significant improvement in readability from 2007 to 2013.
As an analogy to earnings and readability of annual reports, we also hypothesise and test the relation between excess executive compensation and readability of CD&A. We find that the higher the excess total compensation, the more readable the CD&A in two of the three measures. There is no significant relation in excess compensation and Plain English initiative, supporting the hypothesis that companies do follow the required Plain English rule as required by the SEC regardless of excess compensation.
We also test the relation between overpaid or underpaid CEO and readability of the CD&A (similar to Laksmana, Tietz and Yang, 2012) and find that excess CEO overpayment is positively associated with CD&A readability. We further decompose the excess compensation into excess cash and excess noncash compensation and find that our results are driven by excess noncash compensation.
This paper contributes to the field of qualitative analysis of financial disclosures focusing on the readability of the CD&A. Since CD&A was required by the SEC in 2006, companies have made consistent changes to the CD&A to improve its readability. There is significant improvement in CD&A readability from 2006 to 2013. But 7 years after its introduction, in spite of following the Plain English rules, CD&A is still the least readable among the three documents analysed -letter to shareholders, MD&A and CD&A. These findings suggest that there is room for improvement for CD&A. Companies can self-monitor the readability of their CD&As to ensure continued improvement. Probably the simplest way to do so is to get a group of investors or analysts to read the CD&A to see if they understand the disclosure, similar to focus groups. Secondly, we found that the average number of words and numbers used in the document were not likely to be reliable measures of readability for CD&A. Indexes such as Fog and Flesch are better and more consistent in measuring the readability. However, as CD&A is technical in nature, certain words or means of expression may be unreadable for a layman, but routine and easy to understand for an investor with reasonable effort. Therefore, more refined measures of readability are needed for financial reports. As CD&A and annual reports routinely use tables, such measures may also incorporate readability of tabular presentation.
Our study has its limitations. We analysed the readability of CD&A that discloses details of executive compensation. Laksmana, Tietz and Yang (2012) raised the issue of omitted variables, such as transparency of the CD&A, which can affect executive compensation, resulting in an endogeneity problem. It is possible that such an omitted variable may be driving some of our results. Future research could identify potential measures for transparency, such as voluntary disclosures over and above mandated SEC requirements in the CD&A. Another direction future research could be used to identify more refined measures of readability for the CD&A, such as readability of the noncash compensation portion of the CD&A. These measures would likely be fruitful in uncovering the relationship between readability and levels of executive compensation, especially noncash compensation.
Notes
1
We have conducted analysis with year dummies in the regression model for a robustness check. The analysis results for Tables 7, 8 and 9 are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported. 2 We have 1 year data overlap with Laksmana et al. (2012 Laksmana et al. ( ) -year 2007 Laksmana et al. ( (proxy year 2008 . Laksmana et al. (2012) do not find any significant association between excess CEO pay and CD&A readability in that year. Similarly, we also have no result for that year. But for data of years 2007, 2009, 2012 and 2013 combined, we find a positive association between excess CEO pay and CD&A readability.
